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MANAGERIAL QUALITY IN CENTRALIZED VERSUS 
DECENTRALIZED ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we ask, what are the dynamic consequences of a 
greater centralization or decentralization of decision-making authority 
(to appoint managers) on the quality of managers who are actually ap­
pointed? The central result we obtain is that there is a greater varia­
bility (over time) in the quality of managers in a more centralized sys­
tem. An intuitive reason underlying this result is that though a highly 
capable decision maker has large beneficial effects on the managerial 
choices within a centralized system (because this decision maker wields 
greater authority in such a system), a highly incapable decision maker 
placed in the same position has correspondingly large deleterious ef­
fects. Our analysis also investigates the consequences of the above 
differences in managerial quality on the outputs of centralized versus 
decentralized systems. 
:MANAGERIAL QUALITY IN CENTRALIZED VERSUS 
DECENTRALIZED ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
One of the most important tasks facing the leadership of any organi­
zation is the choice of their successors and subordinates. Tenured fac­
ulty spend days, sometimes months, deciding on whether particular indi­
viduals should be admitted into their ranks. The committees of the Board 
of Directors assigned to the task of choosing the corporation's next 
president are among the most powerful and important within the corpora­
tion. Corporate presidents, in turn, spend a significant proportion of 
their own time in selecting the upper echelons of the management. 
The effort and contentiousness which often goes.into this process 
suggests that it has important consequences, both for the organization 
and for the individuals who are selected or not selected. This is be­
cause it is re~ognized that there are large differences in individuals' 
abilities, and that the abilities o~ those in leadership and managerial 
positions inevitably affect the performance, and possibly the survival. 
of the organization. 
Our objective in the present paper is to ask the question, how does 
centralization or decentralization of decision-making authority affect 
the quality of the managers who are actually selected? It is natural to 
pose this question in a dynamic setting because the quality of current 
managers is not only influenced by the quality of past managers but it, 
in turn, affects the quality of future managers. 
1 
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The main result of this paper is that there is a greater variability 
(over time) in the steady-state quality of managers in a more centralized 
system compared to a less centralized system. This result is based on a 
specific definition of what we mean by a "more" or "less" centralized 
system: the systems' is called more centralized than the systems if 
one or more of those managerial slots which are meant for subordinates in 
the systems' are endowed with independent decision-making authority in 
the systems. 
An intuitive reason underlying the above result is as follows. If 
the decision-making authority is more centralized (that is, if one or 
more managerial positions are endowed with greater authority to select 
future managers) then highly capable decision-makers ha~e greater b~ne­
ficial effects on the managerial choices within the system. By the same 
token, highly incapable managers placed in the same positions have great­
er deleterious effects on the managerial choices within such a system. 
The overall effect of greater centralization, therefore, is to induce a 
greater variability, over time, in the system's managerial quality. 
A natural next question which arises is what is the implication of 
the above relationship between the degree of centralization and the man­
agerial quality on the outputs of centralized versus decentralized eco­
nomic systems? Since the relationship between the capability of managers 
and the organization's output can take several different forms, it is not 
surprising that no general answers are available to this question; the 
answer depends, in particular, on the concavity or the convexity of the 
relationship between managers' ability and organizational output. We 
have therefore investigated in detail one special case in which managers 
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choose projects (in addition to choosing their successors and subordin­
ates). In this case we show that: If the managerial screening of pro­
jects is tight (that is, if less than half of the projects get accepted), 
and if the fraction of projects accepted by good and bad managers is 
identical, then the expected steady-state profit in a decentralized sys­
tem is larger than that under a centralized system. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first illustrate the main re­
sults through a highly stylized model in which there are two managers in 
a centralized as well as in a decentralized economic system (Section I). 
We then show in Section II that these results hold under more general 
specifications of centralized and decentralized systems. The implica­
tions of managerial quality on the output and performance of alternative 
systems are analyzed in Section III. In the concluding section, we 
briefly discuss-some of the caveats of our analysis as well as some of 
the possible ways in which the analysis can be extended. 
I. A Simple Model 
There are two types of managers; those with high and low abilities; 
for brevity, they are referred as "good" and "bad" managers respectively. 
We focus here on the managerial ability in selecting future managers. If 
a high ability manager selected a future manager, then q1 denotes the 
probability that he will select a high ability manager, and 1 - q1 de­
notes the probability that a low ability person will be selected. The 
corresponding probabilities for a low ability manager are and 1 - q2 •q2 
Unless stated otherwise, we assume that 1) q1 ) q2 ) O; that is, while 
neither type of manager is perfect, each type has some ability to select 
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high ability managers. We treat q's as exogenously specified parameters; 
the issue of endogeneity of these probabilities is discussed later. 
We consider here two types of organizations: a polyarchy and a hier­
archy, denoted respectively by the superscripts= P and H. 
1 Each 
organization consists of two managers. In a polyarchy, each manager 
selects his own successor. In contrast, in a hierarchy, the higher level 
manager selects both his own successor as well as that of the lower level 
bureaucrat. Clearly, the decision making authority is more centralized 
in a hierarchy. If G and B represent a good and a bad manager respec­
tively, then the four possible combinations of managerial abilities to be 
found are: {GG, GB, BG, BB}. Denote these four possible managerial con­
figurations (or manager~al state·s) of a system by i = 1, 2, 3 and 4 re­
spectively. 
If Q!. denotes the transition probability from the state i to the 
1J 
state j in the systems, then the transition matrices for a polyarchy and 
a hierarchy, respectively, are 
2 2(1ql(l ql) ql(l 41) 41)41 
41(1 q2) 42<1 41) (1 ql)(l 42>4142 
Qp(1) = 
(14142 42<1 - 41) 41(1 42> 41)(1 - 42) 
2 2 
42 42< 1 - 42> 42<1 - 42> (1 - 42> 
s 
41 




41 q (1 - ql) 41 (1 41> (1 - ql)1 
(2) QH = 
42 
2 
42<1 - q2) 42<1 - 42> (1 - 42>2 
2 2 
42< 1 - 42> 42<1- 42> (1 - 42)42 
If the row vector ,rs -- {,rs1• n2 
s • n3 
s • s} deno.tes the equilibrium (steady-n4 
state) probabilities of the four managerial states in the systems. then 
,rs is characterized by 
s ,rSQS(3) 7t = where• 
(4) I: ,r~ = 1 •i 1 
and n! tO. The economic interpretation of nf is obvious: it represents 
the frequency with which the managerial configuration i will be observed 
(over time) in the systems, when the system perpetuates itself in a 
steady-state fashion. 
A simple procedure to obtain the equilibrium probabilities is as 
follows. First, one of the four equations in (3) is redundant because nf 
sum up to unity according to (4); the equation to be dropped thus may be 
chosen at will. Second, note that n2 = nj. Fors= H, this is obvious 
from inspection of (2) and (3). Fors= P, (1) and (3) yield 
n
p 
3 , since 
1 - q1 + q2 > O. If n2= nj is substituted into (3) then one more equa­
tion, for either n2 or nj, can be dropped. The remaining two equations 
of (3), along with (4), can be solved to yield the following for a poly­
archy. 
6 
p p p p2/ p(5) ffl = 42a , ff2 = n3 = 42<1 ql)/a , and 
p 2 p 
= (1 - ql) /aff4 , 
where q = - q2 , and ap = (1 - q)
2 • The equilibrium probabilities forq1 




where aH = 1 - q. 
To verify that the above probabilities are positive, first note that 
1 > q > 0 and, hence, aH > 0 and ap > O. Now, looking at (5) and (6), it 
is obvious that all of these expressions, except that for ff: are posi­
tive. Further, the numerator of ff: can be expressed as: 
(1 - q1 )[q2 (1 q1 ) + (1 - 42 )
2 ] > O. Thus ffi > Oe It then follows from 
(4) that ni < 1. 
Note that the difference in individuals' abilities is critical to 
the present model since, otherwise, the degree of centralization has no 
impact on the distribution of managerial abilities which will emerge in 
the system. This can be verified by substituting 41 = q2 = q (that is, 
q = 0) into (5) and (6), which yields: nf = 42 , ff!= ffj = q(l - q) and 
ff4 = (1 - 4)2. 
Effect of Individuals' Abilities on Systems' Managerial Quality: In 
our model, a higher 41 and q2 means that an individual manager, good and 
bad respectively, has higher ability in selecting managers. To ascertain 
the effect of a worsening or an improvement in the individuals' abilities 
on the managerial quality in a system, we obtain the derivatives of ni's 
7 
with respect to q's. This yields: anf/aqk > 0, and an4/aqk < 0, for 
k = 1 and 2. 2 The following conclusion emerges. 
PROPOSITION 1: If individual managers are more capable in choosing 
future managers, then the probability that an economic system (central-
ized or decentralized) has all high ability managers is higher, and the 
probability that the system has all low ability managers is lower. 
Clearly, both of these results are what we would have expected. 
Note, however, that the effect of individuals' abilities on the probabil­
ity of having a mixed managerial configuration (the configuration with 
good as well as bad managers) is not in general predictable. 
Comparison of Managerial Quality in Alternative Systems: To compare 
the probabilities of various managerial configurations in the two eco­
nomic systems, we obtain the following from (5) and (6). 
(7) - 6 • and 6 • 
where 6 = q2 (1 - q1)q
2/(1 - q) 2 > O. The qualitative implications of ex­
pression (7) are summarized below. 
PROPOSITION 2: The probability that all managers are of high ability, and 
the probability that all managers are of low ability, are lower in a more 
decentralized system. whereas the probability that there is a mixture of 
abilities among managers is higher in a more decentralized system. 
Moreover, note from (7) that: The difference in the probabilities 
of alternative managerial configurations between a polyarchy and a hier-
archy are identical in magnitude. 
Let the random number m denote the number of good managers in an 
8 
economic system, and let ns(m) denote the steady-state probability asso­
ciated with there being m good managers in the systems. Then 
(8) and 
Also, let As be the average number of good managers, and vs be the vari­
ance in the number of good managers in the systems; that is 
2 2 
As = L. ns(m)m. and vs = Lffs(m)m2 - (As)2. Using (5), (6) and (8), 
m=O m=O 
then, we find that AP lH = 0, and VP - VH = -26 < O. These conclusions 
are summarized below. 
PROPOSITION 3: Although the alternative economic systems under consid-
eration have the same average number of good managers, the .variance in 
the number of good managers is lower in a more decentralized system. 
A qualitatively analogous result is: The distribution of the number 
of good managers in a polyarchy is a mean preserving improvement over the 
corresponding distribution in a hierarchy.3 
The intuitive reason underlying the above results is that the bene­
ficial effects of a high ability manager as well as the damaging effects 
of a low ability manager are more pronounced (in affecting the system's 
overall managerial choices) in a hierarchy compared to those in a poly­
archy. A good (or bad) manager in a polyarchy improves (or worsens) the 
choice of his 2Jm successor, but he has no impact on the choices being 
made by other independent decision-making units. In contrast, whether 
the current hierarch (the leader of a hierarchy) is good or bad affects 
not only the choic_e of his own successor but also that of the future 
subordinates. This difference between the two systems generates a 
9 
dynamic process which results in a hierarchy exhibiting a greater ten­
dency towards the extremes of managerial abilities. 
II. More General Centralized versus Decentralized Systems 
The results obtained earlier are robust not only to the size of an 
economic system, but also to the precise degree of centralization within 
an economic system. To demonstrate this, we begin by defining what we 
mean in this paper by a "more centralized" or a "more decentralized" sys­
tem. Consider an economic system consisting of an arbitrary number of 
hierarchies of different sizes. The size of a hierarchy means here the 
number of managers wi~hin the hierarchy, one of whom is the hierarch {the 
boss) and others are subordinates. The current hierarch in a given hier­
archy has the authority to appoint his own successor as well as those of 
his subordinates, but he has no influence on the choice of managers in 
any other hierarchy. Such an economic system could also be called a 
polyarchy of hierarchies, and its features have a closer resemblance to a 
typical economy than those of the polar cases of a pure hierarchy (where 
there is a single boss in the entire economy) or a pure polyarchy {where 
everyone is his own boss). 
Next, consider the following hypothetical experiment. Start with a 
given economic system (that is, a given polyarchy of hierarchies) and 
break up one or more of its constituent hierarchies into smaller hier­
archies. We call the latter system more decentralized because one or 
more of those managerial slots which were meant for subordinates in the 
previous system are now endowed with independent decision-making author­
ity. Our objective in this section then is to compare any two economic 
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systems (with an arbitrarily specified structure of decision-making 
authority) one of which is more decentralized. Such comparisons, it 
should be emphasized, do not depend on whether decentralization is or is 
not feasible in any one of the two alternative systems under considera­
tion. 
Let nM(s) denote the number of hierarchies of size Min the economic 
system s, where M L 1, and it is an integer, and let N(s) = L MnM(s) de-
M 
note the total number of managers in the systems. Then, according to 
our definition, the systems is more decentralized than the systems', if 
N(s) = N(s') = N, and if 
for all J L 1, and the strict inequality holds in (9) for at least one J. 
In the simple polyarchy examined in Section I, for instance, = 2, andn1 
nM = 0 for M # 1. This polyarchy is clearly more decentralized than the 
corresponding hierarchy, where = 1, and nM = 0, for M # 2.n2 
An analogous representation of a more decentralized system is as 
follows. Let fM(s) = MnM(s)/N denote the fraction of the total number of 
managers in the systems who belong to one of the hierarchies of size M. 
If fM(s) is treated as the density of a discrete distribution defined 
over positive integer values of M, then the expression (9) implies that 
the systems is more decentralized than the systems' if the density 
fM(s) is a first-order stochastic worsening of the density fM(s'). 
For later use, we define the average size of hierarchies in the 
economic systems as 
11 
(10) h(s) = _r:&i2~(s)/N 
M 
where the weights used in calculating the average size of hierarchies are 
the numbers of managerial slots in hierarchies of different sizes. It is 
obvious then that the average size of hierarchies must necessarily be 
smaller in a more decentralized system. That is. if the economic system 
sis more decentralized than the systems'. then 
(11) h(s) < h(s') • 
The reverse, on the other hand, need not hold. That is, if two economic 
systems have different average sizes of hierarchies. then it is not al­
ways the case that one of them is more centralized or decentralized com­
pared to the other. 
Now consider a hierarchy of size M, in isolation from all other con­
stituents of the economic system. Recall that the random variable m de­
notes the number of good managers. Within the hierarchy under considera­
tion, m takes integer values ranging from Oto M. The density of min 
this hierarchy is denoted by g(mlM) • and it is 
2 
(12) g(mlM) = I:zkb(m, M, qk) • where 
k=l 
qk)M-m represents the binomial density of m 
successes out of M trials when qk is the probability of success. 
The derivation of (12) is highly intuitive. A critical element in 
the succession process in a hierarchy is the selection of the hierarch 
because the capabilities of other individuals within the hierarchy do not 
12 
4influence the succession process. Now, focussing on the selection of 
hierarchs (that is, the next period's hierarch is chosen by the current 
hierarch, and so on), it turns out that is the (steady-state) proba­z1 
bility that the hierarch is a good manager, and is the probabilityz2 
that the hierarch is a bad manager. 5 Further, it is obvious that the 
binomial density b(m, M, q1 ) represents the probability that m good 
mana­
gers are chosen when the hierarch is a good manager, and b(m, M, q2 ) is 
the corresponding probability when the hierarch is a bad manager. 
Straightforward combination of these probabilities yields (12). 
Next, denote the average number of good managers in the above 
hierarchy of size M by l(M), and the variance of this number by V(m).• 
Then, using (12), (13), and the standard properties of the binomial 
variate, it can be ascertained that 
(14) l(M) = Mz , and
1 
(15) V(M) 
Our interest here is in characterizing the distribution of manager­
ial quality within the economic system as a whole. If n(mls) denotes the 
probability density associated with the state in which there are m good 
managers in the systems, then n(mls) for various m's are obtained from 
the convolution of the densities (12). For instance 
2 ¾fCs) 
(16) n(Ols) = lf{ I zkb(O, M, qk)} , and 
M k=l 
2 ¾fCs) 
(17) n(Nls) = lf{ I: zkb(M, M, qk)} 
M k=l 
13 
denote the probabilities associated with the polar states of the systems 
where. respectively, none of the managers in the system is good, and none 
of the managers in the system is bad. It is straightforward to verify 
that an(0ls)/aqk < o. and an(Nls)/aqk > o. fork= 1 and 2. It can also 
be shown that n(mls') > n(mls), form= 0 and N. 6 Propositions 1 and 2 
thus hold within the more general setup of the present section. 
Finally, letA(s) and Var(s) respectively denote the average number 
of good managers. and the variance in the number of good managers in the 
economic systems. Since the mean or the variance of a sum of indepen­
dent random variables is the same as the sum of their respective means or 
variances, it follows from (10). (14) and (15) that 
(18) A(s) = Nz • and
1 
2 
(19) Var(s) = [z1z2q 
2
h(s) + L zkqk(l - qk)]N 
k=l 
An immediate consequence of (19) is the following result. 
PROPOSITION 4. Var(s') S Var(s), if h(s') Sh(s). That is, the variance 
in the number of good managers in an economic system is smaller if the 
average size of hierarchies within the system is smaller. 
Therefore, recalling our definition of decentralization, it follows 
from (18) and (19) that though a more decentralized system has the same 
average number of good managers, it has a smaller variance in the number 
of good managers. Proposition 3 is thus established for the general eco­
nomic systems under consideration. 
What Propos1tion 4 says, in addition, is that even when two alterna­
tive systems are not strictly comparable to one another, in the sense 
14 
that one of them is not more centralized or decentralized than another 
(based on our definition), it is still possible to infer the difference 
between the two systems concerning the variance in the number of good 
managerso Moreover, such an inference is possible based solely on the 
average size of hierarchies in each of the two system. 
III. Comparison of Outputs 
The relationship between the quality of managers and the output (or 
the performance) of an economic system is a complicated one. It depends 
not only on the distribution of authority within the system, and on the 
set of tasks which the managers are supposed to perform, but also on what 
kinds of positive and negative externalities are exerted by good and bad 
managers on one another. In this section, we examine these aspects 
within the context of the simple model of Section I. 
First consider the case where the (expected) aggregate output of 
both economic systems is the same if they have the same number of good 
managers. Then, from a standard result in the theory of stochastic domi­
nance, and from the observation made earlier that the distribution of the 
number of good managers in a hierarchy is a mean preserving worsening of 
the corresponding distribution in a polyarchy, it follows that: The 
steadr:state output in a polyarchy is larger (smaller) than that in a 
hierarchy if the output is concave (convex) in the number of good mana-
gers. 
The relative performance of a hierarchy is weakened further if the 
yardstick of comparison is not the expected output but the expected util­
ity of the output, and if the utility function is posited to display some 
1S 
risk aversion. In fact, even when output is convex in the number of good 
managers, if the utility function is sufficiently concave in output, the 
expected utility under a polyarchy could exceed that in a hierarchy. 
Although the assumption that a system's output is concave in the 
number of good managers (that is, the output of a system with one good 
manager and one bad manager is greater than half of the outputs of two 
systems, one of which has two good managers and the other has two bad 
managers) might appear reasonable, this is not always the case. If the 
task of the manager is to develop new projects or ideas, then there is a 
presumption that variance helps: it is only the best that has a signifi­
cant value. This presumption is also con~istent with the view that effec­
tive organizations are highly fragile, and that small changes in the tail 
of ability distribution within an economic system may have large effects 
on the overall performance of the system. In these cases, not only is 
the future mix of managerial abilities in a system sensitive to its cur­
rent mix, but also the system's future performance is particularly sen­
sitive to the position of the individual(s) within the system who are 
currently the best. On the other hand, if there is sufficient redundancy 
within an economic system, then its performance may be relatively insen­
sitive to having a limited number of incompetent managers, and a signifi­
cant deterioration in the system's performance might arise only when in­
competency exceeds a certain level. In such cases, the relationship 
--between the managerial quality and the system's performance will be con-
cave. 
In the rest of this section, we analyze a specific example in which 
the tasks of managers are explicitly defined. Managers select projects 
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(from a large set of available projects), in addition to selecting future 
managers. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of 
projects: good projects, yielding an (expected net) profit x; and bad 
projects, yielding a profit -x. Half the projects are of each type. Bad 
managers are assumed not to have any discriminating ability; that is, 
they randomly accept a fraction p2 of the projects. Good managers are 
better not only ~n choosing future managers but also projects; they 
accept a good project with probability Pi and a bad project with 
2 1 2probability p1 , where > p2 > p1 • The fraction of projects which ap1 
good manager accepts is denoted by p1 ; clearly, pl= (pi+ Pi)/2. 
-In a hierarchy, a project is accepted only if both managers accept 
the project. In contrast, in a polyarchy, a project is accepted if any 
one of the two independent managers aqcept it. Thus, a polyarchy is more 
decentralized not only in the selection of successors, but also in the 
selection of projects. 7 Let Yf denote the profit of the systems under 
the managerial state i, where it will be recalled that i = {1, 2, 3, 4} 
correspond respectively to the managerial states {GG, GB, BG, BB}. Then, 
Yi are as follows 8 
Denote the steady state profit in the systems by ys = ! niYi, and 
i 
let AY = yP - yH denote the difference between the profits of the two 
systems. Then (7), (20) and (21) yield 
(22) AY 
17 
Note that the project selection abilities of managers affect the relative 
profit performance only through parameters p1 and p2 , which denote the 
fractions of projects accepted by a good versus a bad manager. In the 
central case where both types of managers accept the same fraction of 
projects (that is, p1 = p2 = p), the screening of projects (by both mana­
gers) is "tight" or "slack" depending simply on whether pis smaller or 
larger than one-half. It follows from (22) then that: If the fraction 
of projects approved by good and bad managers is identical, then the 
steady-state profit in a polyarchy is larger (smaller) than that in a 
hierarchy, provided the screening of projects by managers is tight 
(slack). 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
We have long been aware that political decisions-decisions under­
taken by governments, concerning resource allocations as well as those 
which circumscribe the actions which various individuals can or cannot 
undertake-have vast repercussions; if decisions are made well, much of 
the society benefits; if made badly, much of the society suffers. In 
other words, the quality of public decision-making is a public good, one 
of the most important public good~. 9 
Similarly, we have increasingly become aware in the past fifteen 
years that, even in private organizations, the actions undertaken by one 
individual or organization has important externalities on others. This 
is in part because of the incompleteness of markets and imperfectness of 
information. When the manager of a firm misallocates the firm's re­
sources, he suffers; but so do his stockholders, his suppliers, and often 
18 
his customers. It has increasingly become recognizerl that the management 
of joint stock companies (and indeed, with limited liability, virtually 
all firms) is a quasi-public good. 
Once we recognize that some individuals are better decision-makers 
than others (that is, individuals are not only fallible, but the degree 
of fallibility differs across individuals), and that the managerial qual­
ity of individuals has important re~ercussions on the performance of 
economic systems, then it is natural to ask, what are the determinants of 
a system's managerial quality? In this.paper, we have singled out and 
analyzed one particular determinant, namely, the degree of centralization 
or decentralization of ·the decision-making authority to appoint future 
managers. Our central result suggests that greater centralization leads 
to a greater variability in the system's managerial quality. We end this 
paper by briefly discussing some of the important aspects from which our 
analysis has abstracted. This discussion is meant to be suggestive 
rather than exhaustive. 
First, our model does not fully reflect the continuum of influence 
relationships which might exist within an organizatione For example, our 
assumption that the choices of future managers within a hierarchy are 
made solely by the boss overstates the degree of authority that the 
bosses typically have, and understates the influence that subordinates 
typically exercise on the choices of not only their own successors but 
also their boss's successor. An opposite bias is reflected in our assump­
tion that a subordinate can exercise a veto (similar to one that his boss 
can exercise) in the choice of projects that a hierarchy undertakese 
Though these assumptions can be justified under particular types of cost 
19 
and benefits of exerting influence (including the technologies for com­
municating and interpreting information), it should be apparent that an 
explicit analysis of these costs and technologies will suggest a range of 
influence relationships (as well as intra-organizational specialization 
in different types of decision-making) within different types of organi­
zations, and that the nature of influence relationships which are more 
likely to emerge may depend, in turn, on the architecture of the economic 
system (for instance, on the degree of centralization) to which an organ­
ization belongs. 
Second, we have assumed that the nature of errors made by an indivi­
dual does not depend on the characteristics of the economic system to 
which he belongs. This assumption appears to be an appropriate first ap­
proximation, in the sense that it focusses only on the inherent abilities 
of individuals. It does, however, abstract from the fact that the nature 
of an individual's error does in part depend on what information he 
chooses to collect, and that the costs and benefits of collecting differ­
ent types of information depend, in turn, on the architecture of the 
10economic system. 
Third, we have abstracted from the role that incentives might play 
in influencing individuals' fallibility. We have assumed that each man­
ager makes the best decision he can, and that some managers are better at 
decision-making than others. We believe that there is a great deal of 
truth in this perspective: it is frequently no more difficult to make a 
good decision than to make a bad decision. Moreover, to the extent that 
an individual's fallibility in selecting managers might be related to the 
incentives he faces, it may not be possible to achieve a significant 
20 
amelioration in these incentives through the usual method of assigning 
appropriate property rights. This is because the consequences of incom­
petent decision-making are often not recognized until years after the 
retirement of the individual who had chosen an incompetent successor; and 
by then he has sold his shares or, in the case of older decision-makers 
(who typically outnumber younger persons in leadership positions), has 
died. ln other words, most of the consequences whic~ follow upon the 
choice of an incompetent successor are borne not by the decision maker, 
but by the contemporaries and the successors of the incompetent succes-
sor. 
Finally, and most importantly, the present analysis has abstracted 
from the role and the consequences of natural selection-the fact that 
the economic environment often influences the survival probabilities of 
different individuals and organizations. In a sequel to the present 
paper (1986b) we have analyzed these aspects by extending the framework 
developed here: natural selection leads to the elimination of some cap­
able managers, and it allows for the survival of some incapable managers. 
The magnitude and the consequences of these alternative types of limita­
tions of natural selection depend not only on certain salient properties 
of the natural selection process, but also on the degree of centraliza­
tion or decentralization within the economic system. This analysis 
suggests that the overall effect of natural ~election is likely to be 
more beneficial within a more decentralized system, than within a more 
centralized economic system. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1We have used concepts such as a polyarchy and a hierarchy in a previous 
paper [Sah and Stiglitz (1986a)] but in a very different context. The 
focus there was on fallibility of homogeneous individuals concerning the 
choice of projects, and on the static consequences of such fallibility on 
organizations' performance. 
2Specifically, ani/aq1 = 2q~/(1 - q) 3 ) 0, 
anr/aq2 = 2qz(l - 41)/(l - q) 3 > o. anI/aql = -242(1 - 41)/(l - q) 3 < o. 
and a,{taq2 = -2(1 - q1)
2/(1 - q) 3 < o. The signs of the relevant 
derivatives of nf and n1 can be analogously established. 
3Th.is is established by demonstrating that I 2 {nH(j) - np(j)} 2, 0 for 
cim jic 
all m, where e's are nonnegative integers. and the strict inequality 
holds for at least one m. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) for the 
definition of mean preserving changes in a distribution. 
4This assumption exaggerates the typical asymmetry of authority between 
the hierarch and the subordinates within a hierarchy. Some of the issues 
underlying such an assumption are briefly discussed latero 
the probability of selecting a good manager as the next period's hierarch 
if the current hierarch is a good (respectively, bad) manager. Using 
= 1 - z2 • the preceding expression can be solved to yield (13).z2 
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6Proof: (16) can be reexpressed as: ln n(Ols) = N :I: fM(s)ln t!.M), where 
.M
2 1/M 
t(.M) = { i: zk(l - qk)M} • Since tis non-decreasing in M, a first-
k=l 
order stochastic worsening in the "density" fM(s) must lower ln n(Ols). 
Hence n(Ols) < n(Ols'). An analogous argument shows that 
n(Nls) < n(Nls'). 
7we have assumed here tha~ the centralization of decision-making author­
ity in one dimension (selection of projects) is correlated with that in 
another dimension (selection ot managers). Such an assumption may not 
always be appropriate. 
8 . .
In the expressions for Y!, we have suppressed a constant of proportion-
ality Tx(pi - Pi>, where Tis the number of available projects. It is 
assumed that, in a polyarchy, half of the projects go initially to each 
of the two managers, those rejected by one manager get passed along to 
the other manager, and the same project is not reviewed more than once by 
any one manager. Thus, in the 6G polyarchy, the probability that a good 
projected is accepted is Pi(2 - Pi>• and that a bad project is accepted 
is Pi(2 - Pi). The profit is Yr= Tx[pi(2 - Pi) - Pi(2 - Pi)l, which is 
reexpressed as in (20). In a 6G hierarchy, the probability that a good 
2 
project is ace.opted is (pi) , and that a bad project is accepted is 
2 2 
The proflt is Yf = Tx[<Pi> - (pi)], which is restated as in 
(21). Other expressions in (20) and (21) can be analogously derived. 
For additional details, in the simpler context of managers with homo­
geneous abilities, see Sah and Stiglitz (1986a) • 
..._--·::;..: .. 
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9The extensive literature on public choice which has emphasized the prob­
lem of how preferences can or cannot be aggregated, often misses the 
point that much of public discourse on good or bad governance is con­
cerned not with values but with the abilities of those to be entrusted to 
govern. 
10see Sah and Stiglitz (1986a) for an analysis of endogenous errors in 
the context of project selection by homogeneous individualso 
